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THE GIRARD CASE: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS
Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957)
On January 30, 1957, Specialist Third Class William Girard was
guarding a machine gun during maneuvers with his regiment in Japan.
He killed a Japanese woman who was scavenging expended cartridge
cases nearby, by firing a shell casing from his grenade launcher in her
direction.
A protocol1 between the two countries, made pursuant to the
Security Treaty2 by which Japan had allowed United States forces to
remain within her borders, gave the United States primary jurisdiction
over offenses committed by U.S. servicemen against American persons or
property, or in the performance of official duties. Japan had primary
jurisdiction over other offenses. The protocol also provided that either
country could waive its primary jurisdiction.
A dispute arose in the Criminal Jurisdiction Sub-Committee of the
Joint Committee established by the protocol to reconcile jurisdictional
disputes. The Japanese agreed that Girard was on duty at the time of
the incident, but asserted that the shooting was not in performance of
his duty of guarding the machine gun.3
The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State authorized
American representatives to waive jurisdiction, and Girard was held in
American custody pending trial in the Japanese courts. The District
Court, on Girard's application for a writ of habeas corpus, enjoined the
Secretaries of Defense and State from turning Girard over to the
Japanese authorities, on the ground that such action was unconstitu-
tional.' In reversing, the Supreme Court dismissed the question of the
constitutionality of the waiver provision in a single sentence: "We find
no Constitutional or statutory barrier to the provision as applied here."
The Japanese Peace Treaty5 restored Japan to full sovereignty.
By "sovereignty" in its largest sense is meant supreme, absolute, un-
14 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 1846; T.I.A.S. No.
2848, authorized by an Administrative Agreement, 3 U.S. Treaties and Other
International Agreements 3341; T.I.A.S. No. 2492.
2 3 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 3329; T.I.A.S. No. 2491.
3 Discussion in the Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee of the Joint Commit-
tee, Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. at 540 (1957). The Japanese position before this
committee was that "the incident arose when Girard materially, deviating from
the performance of such duty of his, willfully threw expended cartridge cases away
towards Naka Sakai and Hideharu Onozeki, and thus inviting them to come near
to him, he fired toward them." Ibid. at 540. An Army circular states that "a sub-
stantial departure from the acts a person is required to perform in a particular
duty usually will indicate an act outside of his official duty." Ibid. at 542.
4 Girard v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 21 (D.C. 1957).
53 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 3169; T.I.A.S. No.
2490, 136 United Nations Treaty Series 45.
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controllable power-the absolute right to govern.6  Jurisdiction is an
incident of that right. The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own
territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no
limitation, not imposed by itself.7 This conception is fundamental in
international law and in normal circumstances would hardly be chal-
lenged. A Japanese tourist who committed a crime in the United States
would certainly be subject to trial by an American court according to
American procedures, and by the same token an American tourist who
committed a crime in Japan would be subject to trial by a Japanese court,
according to Japanese procedures.
Any exceptions to the full and complete power of a nation, within
its own territories must be traced to the consent of the nation itself, but
such consent to a restriction of its jurisdiction in favor of a foreign
power may be implied in some circumstances.' The Supreme Court has
said that such consent will be implied where troops march through a
country with the consent of its sovereign,' but other authorities disagree,
at least where a nation consents to receive foreign military forces for
mutual protection in peace time.1" Whether the American view is correct
or not, there is no room. for dispute where the matter of jurisdiction is
covered by express agreement, and here the limits of American and of
Japanese jurisdiction are expressly stated.
The waiver provision is a part of the protocol and therefore a
further limitation on Japan's consent to American jurisdiction. It is
properly a right withheld from the United States by the protocol, not a
right given up by it.
Two lines of cases illustrate by contrast the principles of sovereignty
and consent discussed above. One is based on In re Neagle,n a decision
relied upon by the District Court in enjoining Girard's delivery to the
Japanese authorities.
Neagle, a deputy United States Marshal assigned to guard Supreme
Court Justice Fields, shot David Terry, when Terry assaulted Fields.
In freeing Neagle from the custody of California authorities the Su-
preme Court held that since he was acting in his capacity as a federal
official, Neagle could not be tried in the California courts. Other cases
cited by the District Court applied this principle to a mail truck driver,12
6 1 STORY ON THE CONSTITUTION §207 (1873).
7 Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 135 (1812).
s Ibid. at 136.
9 Ibid. at 138.
10 For an exhaustive discussion of this question in regard to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement, 4 U.S. Treaties and
Other International Agreements 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, see 99 CONG. REc. 8724.
11 135 U.S. 1 (1889).
12 Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920).
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a Coast Guardsman,1 3 a shore patrolman, 4 and a soldier." This im-
munity of federal officials acting under federal law to all but the federal
courts was the basis for the District Court's injunction.
However, these cases involved a jurisdictional dispute, not between
two sovereign nations, but between a state and the federal government,
and this jurisdictional conflict was resolved solely on the basis of the con-
stitutional supremacy of federal authority. The analogy between In re
Neagle and Girard is as remote as the relationship between the United
States and California is remote from that between the United States and
Japan.
The companion cases of Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger'6
also illustrate by contrast the principles of sovereignty involved. The
petitioners in these cases were wives of American servicemen stationed
abroad. Both had shot their husbands and were tried by courts-martial.
The Supreme Court reversed their convictions, holding that a trial by
court-martial deprived them of their Constitutional rights. Mr. Justice
Black stated both the doctrine and the reasoning behind it:
We reject the idea that when the United States acts against
citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The
United States is a creature of the Constitution. Its power and
authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.' 7
The italicized words emphasize one important qualification implicit in
the reasoning. The Constitution affects only action by the United States,
the government it created. The decision that petitioners were entitled to
trial by an American civil court rather than an American court-martial
has no relation to the question whether they might have been properly
tried by the courts of England and Japan where the crimes were
committed. If Girard had been tried by the United States, he would
have been entitled to the protection of its Constitution, but Japan is not
affected by the American Constitution. Its jurisdiction depends on its in-
herent power to control the land and people within its borders. Con-
stitutional rights are not rights in the absolute sense, to be held against
the world. They are simply limitations placed on the United States
Government by the Constitution that created it. As against Japan, rights
under the United States Constitution do not exist.
John C. Broadbent
13 Brown v. Cain, 56 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
14 Lima v. Lawler, 63 F. Supp. 446 (E.D. Va. 1945).
15 Colorado v. Maxwell, 125 F. Supp. 18 (D. Colo. 1954); In re Fair, 100
Fed. 149 (C.C. D. Nebr. 1900).
16 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
1 7 Ibid. at 4; italics added, Court's footnote omitted.
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